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ENEMY COMBATANTS AND DUE PROCESS:
THE JUDICIARY'S ROLE IN CURBING
EXECUTIVE POWER
MELISSA M. TOMKIEL*
"The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and
judiciary, in the same hands ... may justly be pronounced
the very definition of tyranny."1
INTRODUCTION
In response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the
Executive branch launched a global 'war on terror' aimed at
dismantling global terrorist cells and protecting the United
States from further attacks. In the days following September 11,
President Bush declared a state of national emergency and, in
his capacity as Commander in Chief, dispatched United States
military troops to Afghanistan, whose Taliban government was
known to shelter Al Qaeda, the terrorist network claiming
responsibility for the attacks.2  Congress then issued an
authorization for the President to "use all necessary and
appropriate force" against organizations or nations who aided in
the September 11 attacks, and recognized the President's
"authority under the Constitution to take action to deter and
J.D. Candidate, St. John's University School of Law, June 2006; B.A. Political Science,
American Studies, magna cum laude, University of Notre Dame, May 2002. The author
wishes to thank Professor Philip Weinberg for his insight and guidance in the preparation
of this Note.
1 THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 336 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed.,
1961) (expressing Founders' view of need for separation of powers).
2 Proclamation No. 7463, 66 Fed. Reg. 48199 (Sept. 14, 2001) (announcing intent to
act pursuant to statutory authorization in the event of national emergency); see Charles I.
Lugosi, Rule of Law or Rule By Law: The Detention of Yaser Hamdi, 30 AM. J. CRIM. L.
225, 227 (2003) (describing President's escalating rhetoric against terrorists in support of
military action).
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prevent acts of international terrorism against the United
States." 3
Since the military occupation of Afghanistan began, thousands
of individuals suspected of alignment with terrorist networks
have been taken into custody of the U.S. military. Initially it was
determined that of those taken into custody, the American
citizens captured either at home or abroad and foreign nationals
captured within U.S. borders would be tried in the regular court
system. 4 However, in response to the government's expenditure
of considerable resources in developing these federal cases
coupled with the growing concern over intelligence exposure, the
Executive branch began putting those captured into military
brigs for indefinite imprisonment without access to counsel. 5 The
3 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224, 224
(2001).
PL 107-40 provides:
To authorize the use of United States Armed Forces against those responsible for the
recent attacks launched against the United States. Whereas, on September 11, 2001,
acts of treacherous violence were committed against the United States and its
citizens; and Whereas, such acts render it both necessary and appropriate that the
United States exercise its rights to self-defense and to protect United States citizens
both at home and abroad; and Whereas, in light of the threat to the national security
and foreign policy of the United States posed by these grave acts of violence; and
Whereas, such acts continue to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the
national security and foreign policy of the United States; and Whereas, the President
has authority under the Constitution to take action to deter and prevent acts of
international terrorism against the United States: Now, therefore, be it Resolved by
the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress
assembled ....
In General.-That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force
against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or
harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of
international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or
persons.
Id.
4 Michael J. Kelly, Executive Excess v. Judicial Process: American Judicial Responses
to the Government's War on Terror, 13 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 787, 788 (2003)
(explaining that John Walker Lindh, an American citizen, was charged in federal court,
whereas Yassar Hamdi and Jose Padilla, also American citizens, have been detained in
naval brigs); see John Lichtenthal, Note, The Patriot Act and Bush's Military Tribunals:
Effective Enforcement or Attacks on Civil Liberties?, 10 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 399, 415
(2004) (pointing out differences in treatment between Americans citizens).
5 See Kelly, supra note 4, at 788 (offering explanation for government's change in
tactics); see also Lugosi, supra note 2, at 230 (noting that after American citizenship of a
Guantanamo Bay detainee was discovered, he was removed to a naval brig).
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justification for this treatment is that these prisoners have been
designated "enemy combatants" by the Justice Department. 6
The term 'enemy combatant' derives from the Supreme Court
case Ex parte Quirin,7 where the Court ruled that Americans
assisting Nazis in destroying U.S. industrial targets could be
tried in military commissions instead of civilian courts. 8 Even
though at least one of the defendants asserted his American
citizenship and the civilian courts were open, President Roosevelt
designated the defendants, who were mostly German citizens,
"unlawful combatants" and determined that they should be tried
in military tribunals. 9 Although the Court did not accept the
government's argument that the actions of the President were
not subject to judicial review, the Court did affirm the President's
action as well as features of the military tribunals that
disregarded Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights for the
defendants, including the defendant American citizen.1O The
government relies on this case as authority for justifying its
policy of indefinite detention for the current 'enemy
combatants,'11 even though Quirin is highly criticized and often
categorized along side other notorious Supreme Court decisions
such as Plessy v. Ferguson,12 Dred Scott v. Sandford,13 and
Korematsu v. United States.14
6 See Kelly, supra note 4, at 794 (listing two citizens who have been labeled 'enemy
combatants'); see also Steven R. Swanson, Enemy Combatants and the Writ of Habeas
Corpus, 35 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 939, 939-40 (2003) (stating that United States uses label 'enemy
combatant' in order to detain suspected wrongdoers).
7 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (involving German-born saboteurs).
8 See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 37-40 (1942) (presenting rationale against 'enemy
belligerents'); see also Swanson, supra note 6, at 953 (explaining Court's reasoning in
sanctioning a military commission in which to try saboteurs).
9 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 35 (recognizing government's designation of 'unlawful
combatant'); see Swanson, supra note 6, at 951 (giving history of President Roosevelt's
actions toward the detained men).
10 See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 45 (concluding that Fifth and Sixth Amendments placed no
restrictions on authority to try offenses in this case); see also Swanson, supra note 6, at
955 (explaining Court's refusal to treat alleged American citizen differently than other
'unlawful combatants').
11 See Kelly, supra note 4, at 798 (relating government's reliance on Quirin); see also
Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, Authorizations for the Use of Force, International Law, and the
Charming Betsy Canon, 46 B.C. L. REV. 293, 307 (2005) (explaining Court's acceptance of
the government's reliance on Quirin).
12 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
13 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
14 323 U.S. 214 (1944); see Kelly, supra note 4, at 798 (lumping in Quirin with Plessy,
Dred Scott, and Korematsu as disfavored cases).
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The criteria for classification of a detainee as an "enemy
combatant" is kept secret by those responsible for making the
determination, namely the Attorney General, the Secretary of
Defense, and the CIA director.15 As Solicitor General Ted Olsen
explains about the enemy combatant distinction, "[t]here will be
judgments and instincts and evaluations and implementations
that have to be made by the executive that are probably going to
be different from day to day, depending on the circumstances." 16
This elusive definition results in the indefinite detention of a
diverse pool of defendants and has presented the courts with
significant problems in delineating the authority of the Executive
and balancing national security interests against the
Constitutional rights of the accused.17
In each case, ranging from American citizens captured
abroad18  to foreign citizens captured in the U.S.,19 the
government justifies its detention policies with national security
interests and argues that separation of powers precludes the
courts from forcing the government to justify its enemy
combatant classification. 20 This argument is not unique to the
15 See Kelly, supra note 4, at 797 (stating who determines which detainees are 'enemy
combatants'); see also Lugosi, supra note 2, at 228 (noting executive's secrecy over how to
define 'enemy combatant').
16 Charles Lane, In Terror War, 2nd Track for Suspects; Those Designated
'Combatants' Lose Legal Protections, WASH. POST, Dec. 1, 2002, at Al (stating executive
branch's argument that it need not define criteria for classifying 'enemy combatants').
17 See Lugosi, supra note 2, at 228-29 (expressing concern over executive power that
has been enhanced by lack of definite information); see also Abner Mikva, Dangerous
Executive Power, WASH. POST, July 16, 2004, at A21 (worrying about possibilities for
executive abuse).
18 See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510-11 (2004) (plurality opinion)
(involving citizen-detainee who allegedly took up arms with the Taliban and was captured
in Afghanistan); see also U.S. v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 545 (E.D.Va. 2002)
(explaining case of American citizen who attended a military training camp and joined
foreign terrorist organizations in Afghanistan to combat the Northern Alliance and
American forces and was captured abroad in November 2001).
19 See, e.g., U.S. v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 457-58 (4th Cir. 2004) (highlighting
legal situation faced by Zacarias Moussaoui, the so-called 20th hijacker who was
prevented from participating in the September 1 1th terrorist attacks in America because
he was arrested in mid-August 2001 for an immigration violation); see also Ex parte
Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 22-25 (1942) (positing that perhaps the president's power over
enemies who enter the country in times of war as armed invaders intending to commit
hostile acts must be absolute).
20 See generally Frank Dunham, When Yasir Esam Hamdi Meets Zacarias Moussaoui,
4 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & Bus. 21, 27 (2004) (explaining government's reasoning in Hamdi
and Moussaoui and concluding that ultimately government relies on separation of powers
as basis for its arguments); see also Kelly, supra note 4, at 788-89 (reasoning that in the
aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks, in an effort to maintain national
security, the government "demonstrated its zealous intent to pursue those responsible for
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present situation, as it often resurfaces when the scope of the
Executive's power is questioned in the context of providing for
national security. 21 The current situation and the 'War on
Terror,' in which boundaries are blurred and enemies are
undefined, present particular challenges to the judiciary in
determining the Constitutional confines of the Executive's war-
making powers. 22
A. Historical Background
The concept of separation of powers among different
governmental bodies was articulated before the Constitution,23
adopted by the Framers, 24 and has consistently been reaffirmed
by the Supreme Court as essential to the preservation of
American liberty.25 Articles I, II, and III of the U.S. Constitution
the attacks by altering constitutional and legal checks on its power where possible and
violating other constraints where necessary").
21 See Dunham, supra note 20, at 21-24 (outlining a trend in this country to take
actions in times of war in the name of national security that we later "decry and
discredit"); see also Lane, supra note 16, at Al (discussing hotly disputed contention that
the President has power to declare an individual an enemy combatant in the name of
national security and that such a tag allows the President to detain the individual until
he determines that hostilities between the United States and that individual have ended).
22 See Dunham, supra note 20, at 24-26 (commenting that regulations surrounding
detention of "enemy combatants" cause a great amount of public discomfort because they
can be construed as exemplifying the current administration's disregard for civil
liberties); see also Kelly, supra note 4, at 795-97, 806-07 (noting that "the constitutional
allocation of war powers affords the president extraordinarily broad authority as
commander in chief and compels courts to assume a deferential posture in reviewing
exercises of this authority" and further explaining that "[t]he safeguards that all
Americans have come to expect in criminal prosecutions do not translate neatly to the
arena of armed conflict").
23 See MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 221-37 (Thomas Nugent trans., 1949),
available at http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/montesquieu-spirit.html (explaining
idea that different branches of power can exist within a single government); see also
Calvin H. Johnson, Homage to Clio: The Historical Continuity From the Articles of
Confederation into the Constitution, 20 CONST. COMMENTARY 463, 472-73 (2004) (tracing
history of the Constitution as derived from Articles of Confederation; commenting that
many parts of the constitution are in fact "borrowed and carried forward from the text of
the Articles of Confederation").
24 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 124 (1976) (noting that separation of powers
principle was incorporated into U.S. Constitution); see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,
946 (1983) (stating that structure of Constitution as three separate articles exemplifies
the concept of separation of powers).
25 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (reaffirming the principle
that separation of governmental powers is essential to preservation of American liberty);
see also Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 725 (1986) (maintaining that three general
departments of government entirely free from control or influence of other departments
are fundamentally necessary in this country and are described as such in the
Constitution).
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specifically construct and designate powers to each respective
branch. 26
The power to declare and fight wars for the nation's defense is
necessary for the preservation and strength of a national
government. Under the Constitution, this power is specifically
vested in the federal government. 27 However, it is not vested
solely in one branch of government; rather, the federal
government's war-making powers are divided among the
Congress and the Executive. 28 The Constitution specifically vests
the President with the "Executive power" and designates him
Commander in Chief of the armed forces. 29 The Congress is
empowered with the authority to provide for the common
defense, raise and support armies, and declare war.30 Under
their constitutional construction, the Executive and Legislative
branches are capable of taking quick military action: as an
individual, the Executive is capable of making immediate
decisions, while the Congress has the ability to convene and
declare war within a matter of hours. 31 The third branch of the
26 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1-18 (delineating powers granted by the Constitution
to Congress and stating that Congress shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives); U.S. CONST. art. II (listing executive branch's powers and vesting them
in the President); U.S. CONST. art. III (explaining powers granted to judiciary branch).
27 See U.S. CONST. pmbl. ('We the people of the United States, in order to form a more
perfect Union, establish justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common
defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and
our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of
America.") (emphasis added); see also U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 1 (vesting the power to
"provide for the Common Defense and general Welfare of the United States" in the
Congress of the United States).
28 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 11 (granting Congress the power to "declare War, grant
letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make rules concerning Captures on Land and
Water"); U.S. CONST. art II. § 2, cl. 1 (designating the President "Commander in Chief of
the Army and Navy of the United States... ").
29 See U.S. CONST art II. § 2, cl. 1 (mandating that the Executive power shall be
vested in the President and explaining that the President shall be considered Commander
in Chief of the Army and Navy, and of the militia of the several states); see also Patricia
L. Bellia, Executive Power in Youngstown's Shadows, 19 CONST. COMMENTARY 87, 95-96
(2002) (stating that the Constitution vests President with "executive power").
30 See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 11 (enumerating the powers of Congress under the
Constitution); see also Johnson, supra note 23 at 474-75 (stating that the Constitution, as
adopted, gives Congress the power to provide for the common defense and the general
welfare of the United States).
31 See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 1-18 (highlighting powers of Congress); see also U.S.
CONST. art II (announcing powers that President wields as executive power of the United
States).
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tripartite system of government is the judiciary, which has no
war making authority whatsoever. 32
The judiciary was arguably intended by the Framers to be the
weakest of the three branches. 33 Equipped with neither the
power of the "purse" nor the power of the "sword,"34 the Judiciary
has no ability to collect or distribute national monies or wage any
military action and was consequently conceived as the most
innocuous of the branches.35
However, in Marbury v. Madison,36 one of the Supreme Court's
earliest decisions, the Court secured its position as a co-equal
branch of government capable of declaring void and
unconstitutional actions of the legislative or executive
branches. 37 Although the power of judicial review is not expressly
articulated in the Constitution and the judiciary is technically
incapable of enforcing any of its decisions, 38 as a matter of policy
32 See U.S. CONST. art III (listing powers granted by the Constitution to the judiciary
branch); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 522-23 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E.
Cooke ed., 1961) [hereinafter THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 I] (positing that judiciary branch
has ability only to render judgments and does not have authority over the "sword").
33 See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 I, supra note 32, at 522 ("[Tlhe judiciary, from the
nature of its functions, will always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the
Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or injure them."); see also J.
Randy Beck, Presidential Defiance of "Unconstitutional" Laws: Reviving the Royal
Prerogative, 16 CONST. COMMENTARY 419, 424 (1999) (book review) (explaining that the
Founders did not intend for the judiciary to exercise the more general power of
suspending or dispensing with statutes but, rather, intended for it to exercise the lesser
power of judicial review).
34 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 I, supra note 32, at 522-23 ('The Executive not only
dispenses the honors, but holds the sword of the community. The legislature not only
commands the purse, but prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights of every
citizen are to be regulated. The judiciary on the contrary has no influence over either the
sword or the purse, no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the society, and
can take no active resolution whatever."); see also U.S. CONST. art III (specifying powers
reserved for the judiciary).
35 See U.S. CONST. art III (creating the judicial branch of federal government); THE
FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 476 (Alexander Hamilton) (Garry Wills ed., 1982) [hereinafter THE
FEDERALIST No. 78 II] (noting that the judiciary has no influence over the country's
defense or finances).
36 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
37 See id. at 176-80 (discussing judicial review as allowing the Court to invalidate
laws which it finds unconstitutional); see also Hon. Shira A. Scheindlin & Matthew L.
Schwartz, With All Due Deference: Judicial Responsibility in a Time of Crisis, 32 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 795, 798 (2004) (commenting that the Supreme Court "early on held that the
judiciary is a co-equal branch of government").
38 See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 II, supra note 35, at 476 (stating that "[i]t may truly be
said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment; and must ultimately
depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments"); see also
Ronald M. George, Chief Justice of California, Challenges Facing An Independent
Judiciary, 11th Annual Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. Lecture on State Courts and
Social Justice at New York University School of Law (Jan. 26, 2005), in 80 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1345, 1346 (2005) (describing the judicial branch as incapable of enforcing its decisions).
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and for the sake of the stability of the nation, the Court's power
of judicial review is rarely questioned. When the actions of one
branch encroach on the authority of another branch, 39 the Court
is called upon to balance the competing interests of the
conflicting branches against the danger posed by intruding upon
the province of another branch.40 Although the Court has ruled
that the propriety of war is a political question and thus not
subject to judicial review, 41 actions and policies of the other
branches in the execution of war are subject to judicial
scrutiny.42
As a result of the judiciary's deliberative nature, it could take
several weeks or months for a Constitutional matter to be
litigated and decided. 43 However, because of the need for
immediate action, courts have traditionally applied a diminished
standard of review to cases regarding the wartime policies of
Congress and the Executive. Yet, it is still essential that the
courts consider whether the policies and actions taken are truly
measures of national defense, or are merely unconstitutional
39 See, e.g., Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 702 (1997). Responsibilities do overlap
under our system in ways that do not necessarily impair one branch's ability to perform
its functions under the Constitution. See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 757
(1996). Although the branches are not to be completely sealed off from one another, "it
remains a basic principle of our constitutional scheme that one branch of the Government
may not intrude upon the central prerogatives of another." Id.
40 See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 753 (1982) (noting that "a court, before
exercising jurisdiction, must balance the constitutional weight of the interest to be served
against the dangers of intrusion on the authority and functions of the Executive Branch");
see also Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977) (discussing the Court's
duty to ensure that an act does not disrupt "the proper balance between the coordinate
branches").
41 See O'Connor v. United States, 72 Fed. Appx. 768, 771 (10th Cir. 2003) (concluding
that no judicially discoverable standards can be identified that "would permit a court to
determine whether the intentions of the president in prosecuting a war are proper"); see
also Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1043-44 (2d Cir. 1971) (noting that there are "no
intelligible and objectively manageable standards by which to judge" propriety of military
action in Vietnam).
42 See Custer County Action Ass'n v. Garvey, 256 F.3d 1024, 1031 (10th Cir. 2001)
(outlining situations in which courts will not hesitate to review military action); see also
Mindes v. Seaman, 453 F.2d 197, 200 (5th Cir. 1971) (stating that "[i]n numerous cases
the courts of appeal have held that review is available where military officials have
violated their own regulations").
43 See Scheindlin, supra note 37, at 796 (describing the judiciary as deliberative in
nature); see also Daniel A. Farber, Judicial Supremacy Today: The Importance of Being
Final, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 359, 361-62 (2003) (describing deliberative nature of
adjudicatory process).
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assertions of power disguised as necessities during wartime to
survive judicial review. 44
For example, early in our nation's history, during the
administration of John Adams, 45 the Alien and Sedition Acts of
1798 were adopted, authorizing the executive branch to deport
aliens that it judged to be dangerous to peace and good order.46
Under the act, any immigrant deemed dangerous by the
President was deported without any trial, counsel, or even a
specific accusation. 47 Likewise, the Sedition Act 48 was passed the
same year, prohibiting any criticism of the President and
Congress and flying directly in the face of the First
Amendment.49 The Act was passed because of the heated political
climate presented by the ongoing war between Great Britain and
44 See James Thuo Gathii, Torture, Extraterritoriality, Terrorism, and International
Law, 67 ALB. L. REV. 335, 363 (2003) (arguing that "[mierely because executive conduct
occurs overseas and involves issues of war does not mean the courts automatically shed
their constitutional role"); see also Scheindlin, supra note 37, at 796 (stating "the first
question in every case is whether the action taken is truly part of the war effort, or
whether 'war' is being invoked to insulate actions that would not otherwise survive
judicial review").
45 See JAMES BISHOP PEABODY, JOHN ADAMS: A BIOGRAPHY IN HIS OWN WORDS 6
(Joseph L. Gardner ed., Harper & Row 1973). Although amongst the most important
Founders, John Adams received the least public attention and acclaim. Whitehouse.gov,
Biography of John Adams, http://www.whitehouse.gov/history/presidents/ja2.html (last
visited Mar. 20, 2006). He later became the second President of the United States,
serving from 1797-1801. Id.
46 See Dunham, supra note 20, at 21-22 (describing this Executive power under the
Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798); see also James F. Smith, United States Immigration
Policy-A History of Prejudice and Economic Scapegoatism?: A Nation that Welcomes
Immigrants? An Historical Examination of United States Immigration Policy, 1 U.C.
DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POLY 227, 229 (1995) (stating the power given to the president by the
Acts).
47 See An Act Concerning Aliens, ch. 585, § 1, 1 Stat. 570, 570-71 (1798) (authorizing
the President "at any time during the continuance of this act, to order all such aliens as
he shall judge dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States, or shall have
reasonable grounds to suspect are concerned in any treasonable or secret machinations
against the government thereof, to depart out of the territory of the United States, within
such time as shall be expressed in such order."); see also Aaron J. O'Brien, Note, States'
Repeal: A Proposed Constitutional Amendment To Reinvigorate Federalism, 44 CLEV. ST.
L. REV. 547, 567 (1996) (describing this feature of the Alien Act).
48 Sedition Act, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798) (created in addition to the act entitled "An
Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States").
49 See id. at § 2, 1 Stat. at 596-97 (stating "[tihat if any person shall write, print,
utter or publish, or shall cause or procure to be written, printed, uttered or published, or
shall knowingly and willingly assist or aid in writing, printing, uttering or publishing any
false, scandalous and malicious writing or writings against the government of the United
States, or either house of the Congress of the United States, or the President of the
United States, with intent to defame the said government, or either house of the said
Congress, or the said President, or to bring them, or either of them, into contempt or
disrepute;... "); see also Dunham, supra note 20, at 21 (describing the Sedition Act as
"prohibit[ing] criticism of the president and the Congress - imagine that - just a few
years after we passed the First Amendment").
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France.50 Adams, a Federalist, advocated neutrality and sought
to avoid what seemed to be a likely war with France, while other
Federalists were eager to declare war against the French. The
opposing political party, the Republicans, were sympathetic to
the French cause. 51 Additionally, many citizens of both England
and France were living within the United States at the time and
many were eager to criticize the administration. 52 Thomas
Jefferson, Adams' successor as President and the leader of the
Republican Party, allowed the Acts to expire and pardoned all
those convicted under the Acts. 53
During the 1860s, in the midst of the Civil War, Abraham
Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas corpus. 54  Lincoln
accomplished this by issuing a presidential proclamation stating
that all persons guilty of any disloyal practice shall be subject to
court martial.55 The authority to do this was challenged by
Merryman who, without a warrant against him, was taken from
his home at two o'clock in the morning and imprisoned at Fort
50 See Dunham, supra note 20, at 21 (explaining that while Adams favored Great
Britain, many people including the opposing political party favored France); see also
Samuel R. Olken, Chief Justice John Marshall and The Course of American
Constitutional History, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 743, 754 (2000) (explaining that John
Adams "sought to maintain American neutrality in the wake of international conflict
between Great Britain and France").
51 See Dunham, supra note 20, at 21 (reviewing political landscape during Alien and
Sedition Acts); see also Jules Lobel, The Limits of Constitutional Power: Conflicts Between
Foreign Policy and International Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1071, 1097 (1985) (describing early
American Republican party sympathy toward France).
52 See Dunham, supra note 20, at 21 (noting that many residents within the United
States were citizens of either Britain or France and accordingly held allegiances to their
home countries); see also Daniel Kanstroom, From the Reign of Terror to Reigning in the
Terrorists: The Still-Undefined Rights of Non-Citizens in the "Nation of Immigrants", 9
NEW ENG. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 47, 71-74 (2003) (remarking upon alleged threatening
criticism of 1790's American government by non-citizens regarding international conflicts
in as foundation for Alien and Sedition Act legislation).
53 See Michael P. Downey, Note, The Jeffersonian Myth in Supreme Court Sedition
Jurisprudence, 76 WASH. U. L. Q. 683, 694 (1998) (commenting on Jeffersonian policies
including his pardoning of those convicted under 1798's alien and sedition acts); see also
Saikrishna Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 521, 541 (2005)
(recognizing pardons given by Thomas Jefferson following expiration of Alien and Sedition
Acts).
54 See Dunham, supra note 20, at 22 (highlighting President Abraham Lincoln's
suspension of habeas corpus); see also Paul Finkelman, Limiting Rights in Times of
Crisis: Our Civil War Experience - A History Lesson For a Post- 9-11 America, 2 CARDOZO
PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 25, 33 (2003) (acknowledging Lincoln's suspension of habeas
corpus during the American Civil War).
55 See Dunham, supra note 20, at 22 (analyzing suspension of habeas corpus by
Lincoln); see also Eric Muller, All the Themes But One, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1395, 1399
(1999) (writing about Lincoln's methodology for enforcing suspension of habeas corpus).
[Vol. 21 1
2006] ENEMY COMBATANTS AND DUE PROCESS
McHenry. 56 The government claimed his detention was based on
treason and rebellion, without proof or even specific allegations of
what constituted these crimes. 57 Lincoln's action was struck
down in federal court as overreaching, and the court noted that
according to the Constitution, only Congress has the authority to
suspend habeas corpus. 58 Notwithstanding the court's ruling and
subsequent issuance of the writ, Lincoln detained Merryman in
military custody until he was later indicted for conspiracy to
commit treason. 59
Also during the Civil War, the constitutionality of trying
civilians in military tribunals was challenged. 60 Milligan, a
civilian, was accused by the federal military in Indiana of being
disloyal to the federal war effort and was sentenced to be
hanged.61 Milligan filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with
the Supreme Court.62 In a surprising stance against the
Executive, the Supreme Court ruled that Milligan was not within
the jurisdiction of the military courts and was entitled to process
in Article III courts when they were open and operating. 63
During World War I, Congress passed the Espionage Act of
56 Exparte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 147 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (working through facts
regarding Merryman's case); see also Finkelman, supra note 54, at 35-36 (reciting facts
regarding circumstances of Merryman's arrest and its impact).
57 See Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 147 (assessing government's claims regarding
Merryman's detention); see also Finkelman, supra note 54, at 36 (reviewing government's
charges against Merryman).
58 U.S. CONST. art I, § 9 (explicating Congress' constitutional role in suspending
habeas corpus); see also Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 149 (discussing impropriety of
Presidents performing this suspension without congressional authority).
59 See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME
38-39 (First Vintage Books 2000) (1998) (certifying facts regarding Merryman's
detainment in defiance of court order, and later reviewing Merryman's charges); see also
Finkelman, supra note 54, at 39 (noting that President Lincoln largely ignored Supreme
Court's ruling in Merryman).
60 See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 121-22 (1866) (discussing use of military law for
civilians); Major Kirk L. Davies, The Imposition of Martial Law in the United States, 49
A.F. L. REV. 67, 96-97 (using Milligan as evidence for past use of martial law on
civilians).
61 See Milligan, 71 U.S. at 107 (explaining factual bases for Milligan's appeal); see
also Finkelman, supra note 54, at 41-42 (discussing relevant facts regarding Milligan's
detainment and charges).
62 See Milligan, 71 U.S. at 107 (following procedural route of Milligan's case to the
Supreme Court); see also Finkelman, supra note 54, at 36 (running through procedural
dispositions of Milligan's case).
63 See Milligan, 71 U.S. at 127 (understanding that courts may be closed due to
insurrection and thus martial law may sometimes be appropriate); REHNQUIST, supra
note 59, at 137 (noting court decision's limited application mandating civilian law only
when courts are open).
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1917,64 prosecuting dissenters to the war and the draft. On three
separate occasions the Supreme Court affirmed convictions under
that Act.65 Additionally, Congress passed the Sedition Act of
1918, making it unlawful to publish any disloyal language
intended to cause contempt or scorn for our form of
government.66 Similarly, during the Red Scare of 1919 to 1920,
thousands of citizens were summarily deported without due
process. 67
After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and America's entry
into World War II, the national security rationale prompted the
Court to uphold the constitutionality of the internment of
individuals of a certain ethnic origin in the now notorious
Supreme Court decision of Korematsu v. United States68. As a
result many thousands of people were interned because of their
Japanese ancestry, including U.S. citizens. 69 In 1983, President
Ronald Reagan said Korematsu did a grave injustice, and gave
the National Medal of Freedom to Fred Korematsu. 70
Additionally, Congress voted to spend millions of dollars in
reparations to those who were interned. 71
64 See Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, § 3, 40 Stat. 217, 219 (1917), amended by ch. 75,
§ 1, 40 Stat. 553 (1918) (codifying criminal laws regarding draft dodgers and dissenters
during wartime); see also Dunham, supra note 20, at 22 (noting use of espionage act in
1917 to prosecute war dissenters).
65 See, e.g., Abrams v. U.S., 250 U.S. 616, 616-17 (1919) (upholding conviction under
Espionage Act for publishing anti-war material); Debs v. U.S., 249 U.S. 211, 211-12
(1919) (affirming conviction under Espionage Act for advocating pro-socialist measures);
Schenck v. U.S., 249 U.S. 47, 47-48 (1919) (upholding conviction under Espionage Act for
distribution of leaflets containing anti-war material).
66 See Sedition Act of 1918, ch. 75, 40 Stat. 553, 553-54 (1918), repealed by ch. 136, 41
Stat. 1359 (1921) ("An Act to punish acts of interference with the foreign relations, the
neutrality, and the foreign commerce of the United States, to punish espionage, and
better to enforce the criminal laws of the United States, and for other purposes"); see also
John W. Whitehead & Steven H. Aden, Forfeiting "Enduring Freedom" for "Homeland
Security" A Constitutional Analysis of the USA Patriot Act and the Justice Department's
Anti-Terrorism Initiatives, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 1081, 1097 (2002) (surveying 1918's Sedition
Act and its usage).
67 See David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 995 (2002) (reviewing origins
of 1919 red scare); see also Dunham, supra note 20, at 23 (discussing mass deportation
due to Red Scare).
68 See Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214, 214-17 (1944) (upholding constitutionality of
Japanese internment camps used during World War II); see also Dunham, supra note 20,
at 23 (reiterating history regarding Korematsu and its effect).
69 See William Fisher, Rights: WWII Register Against Intenment of Japanese Dies at
86, IPS-INTER PRESS SERVICE, April 1, 2005 (providing examples of who was interned).
70 See Orville Schell, Rounding Up Americans, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1984, at § 7, p. 22
(exploring the injustice).
71 See Laura K. McFadden, 'Justice Has Finally Prevailed, Japanese-Americans
await cash reparations from the U.S. for internment during WWII, NEWSDAY, Dec. 24,
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Thus, history has shown that during times of emergency the
actions of the government can pose the most substantial threats
to the civil liberties of not only alien criminal defendants or those
captured during war time, but also of American citizens and
civilians. 72 Moreover, in times of crisis, blind deference to the
Executive has led the Supreme Court to hand down decisions
that tarnish U.S. history.73 This Note suggests that the
Executive will always have a compelling interest in national
security, an interest that is naturally heightened during time of
war.74 However, it is asserted that fear of a military assault
should not jeopardize the constitutional rights of accused
individuals,7 5 regardless of their citizenship or the egregiousness
of the crime charged against them.76
I. RECENT CASES: "ENEMY COMBATANTS"
The latest threat to civil liberties arises with regard to
prisoners taken into captivity in the recent military occupation of
Afghanistan and other regions in the Middle East classified as
'enemy combatants.'
1989, at 17 (noting that many Japanese-Americans were celebrating this long awaited
day).
72 See Scheindlin, supra note 37, at 801 (stating that judges need to be vigilant in
times of crisis to protect constitutional guarantees); see also Lee Epstein, Daniel E. Ho,
Gary King & Jeffrey A. Segal, The Supreme Court During Crisis: How War Affects Only
Non-War Cases, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2005) (postulating how detrimental effects arise
from war-time decisions).
73 See Dunham, supra note 20, at 21 (admitting "[o]ur country in times of crisis has a
history of actions we later decry and discredit"); see also Jennifer M. Hannigan, Comment,
Playing Patriot Games: National Security Challenges Civil Liberties, 41 HOUS. L. REV.
1371, 1375 (2004) (detailing how our government finds itself remorseful and embarrassed
after realizing a deprivation of civil liberties was unnecessary).
74 See Scheindlin, supra note 37, at 796 (asking whether "the courts should abdicate
their traditional role - or [whether] the rule of law is suspended - when the nation is at
war?"); see also Rana Jazayerli, War and the First Amendment: A Call for Legislation to
Protect A Press' Right of Access to Military Operations, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 131,
132 (1997) (discussing government suppression of the First Amendment during wartime).
75 See Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 324-25 (1946) (Murphy, J. concurring)
(stating that "the unconstitutionality of the usurpation of civil power by the military is so
great in this instance as to warrant this Court's complete and outright repudiation of the
action"); see also Whitehead & Aden, supra note 66, at 1124 (discussing constitutional
safeguards owed to accused persons even during times of war).
76 See Kelly, supra note 4, at 788 (stating that constitutional protections and
fundamental notions of due process are applicable to all defendants within jurisdiction of
American courts); see also David Cole, Rounding up Unusual Suspects: Human Rights in
the Wake of 9/11: Are Foreign Nationals Entitled to the Same Constitutional Rights as
Citizens?, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 367, 367 (2003) (arguing that foreign nationals are
entitled to rights of American citizens).
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A. John Walker Lindh
Slightly over a month after the September 11 attacks a handful
of captured Taliban soldiers led a revolt in a prison near Mazar-e
Sharif, a town in northwest Afghanistan.77 Although the uprising
was ultimately quashed by Northern Alliance troops, hundreds of
prisoners along with U.S. C.I.A. agent Michael Spann were
killed. Those Taliban prisoners who survived fled to the
basement of the prison during the revolt and were eventually
flushed out when Northern Alliance forces diverted an irrigation
stream into the basement. 78 One of those surviving prisoners
who emerged from the basement was John Walker Lindh, a
twenty year old American man raised in northern California.
Lindh was immediately taken into U.S. custody and questioned
by the FBI and CIA.79 The most serious of the numerous criminal
charges against Lindh was conspiracy to kill U.S. nationals, due
to the death of Agent Spann.8O Lindh's defense attorney argued
that upon being taken into custody, Lindh requested legal
representation, and was denied access to an attorney for 54 days
while he was held incommunicado.S1 During this time
government officials leaked evidence to the media regarding
Lindh's case,8 2 prejudicing the public regarding his guilt or
innocence. Attorney General John Aschroft denied these
allegations and asserted that Lindh waived his right to defense
counsel both orally and in writing when he was being
interrogated.8 3 Ultimately, Lindh pleaded guilty to one count of
supplying services to the Taliban and to a criminal information
charge that he carried arms while fighting against the Northern
Alliance in exchange for a twenty year sentence and the
dismissal of all other charges. 8 4 Due to this plea the
77 See CNN.com, John Walker Lindh, Profile,The Case of the Taliban American,
http://www.cnn.com/CNN/Programs/people/shows/walker/profile.html (last visited Mar.
20, 2006).
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 See CNN.com, John Walker Lindh makes first court appearance,
http://archives.cnn.com/2002/
LAW/O1/24/walker.court/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2006).
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 See U.S. v. Lindh, 227 F. Supp. 2d 565, 570 (2002) (holding Lindh guilty of
violating U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.4 (2006)).
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constitutionality of his treatment upon his capture was not
contested.
B. Yaser Esam Hamdi
Yaser Hamdi, born in Louisiana, is an American citizen who
moved to Saudi Arabia as a young child.85 Hamdi first came into
military custody after the surrender of the Taliban late in 2001.86
Once captured, Hamdi was determined to be an enemy
combatant;87  he was transferred to several prisons in
Afghanistan, passed through Camp X-Ray in Guantanamo Bay,
and, ultimately, placed in a naval brig in South Carolina. The
government's authority to take custody of Hamdi was Pub. L. No.
107-40 (Authorization for Military Force).8s No charges were
brought against him. Once in Norfolk, the district's public
defender Frank Dunham requested to see Hamdi, who was being
tried in the same district as John Walker Lindh. Anticipating a
criminal case against Hamdi and aware that the strongest
evidence used in the case against Lindh was Lindh's own
statements made while in custody,8 9 Dunham wanted to provide
Hamdi with the appropriate advice. However, it was not until
several weeks into the case that Dunham was informed that his
inclination was wrong and that, in fact, no criminal charges were
pending against Hamdi.90 The government's sole justification for
85 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004) (plurality opinion).
86 Id. at 510.
87 Id. at 512-13.
88 See Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224, 224
(2001) (authorizing President's use of United States Armed Forces to "use all necessary
and appropriate force ... in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism
against the United States"); see also Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 510 (stating that purpose of
Authorization for Use of Military Force was "to subdue al Qaeda and quell the Taliban
regime that was known to support it").
89 See Dunham, supra note 20, at 33 (explaining particular concerns about "providing
Hamdi with appropriate advice, particularly, you know, little things like the right to
remain silent which sometimes the military says doesn't apply to a military interrogation
for intelligence purposes"); see also Katharine Q. Seelye, Threats and Responses: The
Detainee; Court to Hear Arguments in Groundbreaking Case of U.S. Citizen Seized With
Taliban, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2002, at A13 ("Mr. Dunham immediately sought to
interview his client to determine if he was indigent and needed a lawyer, but the
Pentagon never responded.").
90 See Dunham, supra note 20, at 33 (stating that four weeks after Dunham's
presence on the case, he was informed that Hamdi was being held as an enemy combatant
and was not to be prosecuted criminally); see also Katherine Q. Seelye, A Nation
Challenged: Prisoners; Believed to be U.S. Citizen, Detainee is Jailed in Virginia, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 6, 2002, at A7 (stating that as of April 6, 2002, nearly a month after Hamdi's
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detaining Hamdi was because he was being held as an enemy
combatant. 91
Seeking justification for the incarceration of a United States
citizen, Hamdi and Dunham, who sought "next friend" status and
demanded unmonitored conversations with his client, a halt to
interrogations, and his release, filed petitions of habeas corpus
with the federal district court for the Eastern District of
Virginia. 92  The court combined the petitions and granted
Dunham immediate unmonitored contact with Hamdi.93 The
United States appealed this decision to the Fourth Circuit, which
remanded with instructions to dismiss; it held that Dunham and
Hamdi lacked standing to file the habeas petitions due to
Dunham's lack of a private relationship with Hamdi.94
While this decision was pending in the Fourth Circuit, Hamdi's
father filed a habeas petition in district court seeking next friend
status, the appointment of counsel to Hamdi, the cessation of
government interrogations, and Hamdi's release. 95 The district
court allowed Hamdi's father to proceed as next friend, appointed
counsel, and ordered that Hamdi be allowed unmonitored contact
with counsel. 96 After the government's appeal, the Fourth Circuit
again reversed and ruled that the district court must first
thoroughly brief Hamdi's case before Hamdi was granted access
to counsel. 97 On remand to the district court, the government
was, for the first time in about eight months after Hamdi's
detention, ordered to produce evidence to justify its contention
February 11, 2002 transfer to Guantanamo, officials did not charge Hamdi with a crime
and "it [was] not clear ... what charges [Hamdi] might face").
91 See Dunham, supra note 20, at 33 (stating that government officials did not plan on
prosecuting Hamdi, but instead were classifying him as an enemy combatant); see also
Seelye, supra note 89, at A13 (stating that the Bush administration considered Hamdi to
be an "enemy combatant" and could therefore be held until "hostilities cease").
92 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 511 (2004) (plurality opinion).
93 Id. at 507.
94 Id. at 507.
95 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 279 (4th Cir. 2002) (stating that Esam Foud
Hamdi filed a "next friend" application on behalf of his son Yaser Esam Hamdi); see also
James Park Taylor, Singularity: We Have Met the Enemy and He is Us: A Legal Guide to
U.S. Citizens as 'Enemy Combatants, 29 MONTANA LAWYER 8, 9 (2004) (describing
chronology of Esam Fouad Hamdi's "next friend" application).
96 See Hamdi, 296 F.3d at 279 (describing lower court decision granting Esam Foud
Hamdi's "next friend" application). See generally Dunham, supra note 20 (telling story of
Yasir Hamdi's legal battle from perspective of court appointed public defender).
97 Hamdi, 296 F.3d at 282-83 (remanding for further proceedings); see also Philip
Shenon, Appeals Court Keeps an American Detainee and His Lawyer Apart, N.Y. TIMES,
July, 13, 2002, at As (explaining Fourth Circuit decision).
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that Hamdi was allied with the Taliban.9S The sole evidence was
a statement made by a special advisor to the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy, 99 known as the "Mobbs Declaration"100 which
98 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 512 (2004) (plurality opinion) (describing
government's response to motion to dismiss in district court); see also Frank W. Dunham
Jr., Where Moussaoui Meets Hamdi, 183 MIL. L. REV. 151, 167 (2005) (stating that the
district court was directed to "exhaust all other avenues before taking the drastic step of
allowing petitioner to see his counsel").
99 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 512 ("[The Mobbs Declaration] remains the sole evidentiary
support that the Government has provided to the courts for Hamdi's detention.");see also
Dunham, supra note 98, at 168 ('The government argued that the declaration, which was
based on Mobbs' review of the file ... was factually dispositive as to whether Hamdi had
been properly classified as an enemy combatant.").
100 The full test of the Mobbs Declaration reads:
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, I, Michael H. Mobbs, Special Advisor to the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy, hereby declare that, to the best of my knowledge,
information and belief, and under the penalty of perjury, the following is true and
correct:
1. I am a Special Advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. In this
position, I have been substantially involved with matters related to the detention
of enemy combatants in the current war against the al Qaeda terrorists and
those who support and harbor them (including the Taliban). I have been
involved with detainee operations since mid-February 2002 and currently head
the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy's Detainee Policy Group.
2. I am familiar with Department of Defense, U.S. Central Command and U.S.
land forces commander policies and procedures applicable to the detention,
control and transfer of al Qaeda or Taliban personnel in Afghanistan during the
relevant period. Based upon my review of relevant records and reports, I am also
familiar with the facts and circumstances related to the capture of Yaser Esam
Hamdi and his detention by U.S. military forces.
3. Yaser Esam Hamdi traveled to Afghanistan in approximately July or August of
2001. He affiliated with a Taliban military unit and received weapons training.
Hamdi remained with his Taliban unit following the attacks of September 11 and
after the United States began military operations against the al Qaeda and
Taliban on October 7, 2001.
4. In late 2001, Northern Alliance forces were engaged in battle with the Taliban.
During this time, Hamdi's Taliban unit surrendered to Northern Alliance forces
and he was transported with his unit from Konduz, Afghanistan to the prison in
Mazar-e-Sharif, Afghanistan which was under the control of the Northern
Alliance forces. Hamdi was directed to surrender his Kalishnikov assault rifle to
Northern Alliance forces en route to Mazar-e-Sharif and did so. After a prison
uprising, the Northern Alliance transferred Hamdi to a prison at Sheberghan,
Afghanistan, which was also under the control of Northern Alliance forces.
5. While in the Northern Alliance prison at Sheberghan, Hamdi was interviewed
by a U.S. interrogation team. He identified himself as a Saudi citizen who had
been born in the United States and who entered Afghanistan the previous
summer to train with and, if necessary, fight for the Taliban. Hamdi spoke
English.
6. Al Qaeda and Taliban were and are hostile forces engaged in armed conflict
with the armed forces of the United States and its Coalition partners.
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the government contended was sufficient evidence to detain
Hamdi without a single hearing.101
Judge Doumar of the district court for the Eastern District of
Virginia was not persuaded by this sparse evidence. 102 Judge
Doumar identified the judiciary's role in securing the
constitutional rights of the accused, even in the face of the
government's claim of national defense. 103 Invoking the language
of a prior Supreme Court case, 104 Judge Doumar stated:
The standard of judicial inquiry must also recognize
that the "concept of 'national defense' cannot be
Accordingly, individuals associated with al Qaeda or Taliban were and continue
to be enemy combatants. Based upon his interviews and in light of his association
with the Taliban, Hamdi was considered by military forces to be anenemy
combatant.
7. At the Sheberghan prison, Hamdi was determined by the U.S. military
screening team to meet the criteria for enemy combatants over whom the United
States was taking control. Based on an order of the U.S. land forces commander,
a group of detainees, including Hamdi, was transferred from the Northern
Alliance-controlled Sheberghan prison to the U.S. short-term detention facility in
Kandahar. Hamdi was in-processed and screened by U.S. forces at the Kandahar
facility.
8. In January 2002, a Detainee Review and Screening Team established by
Commander, U.S. Central Command reviewed Hamdi's record and determined he
met the criteria established by the Secretary of Defense for individuals over
whom U.S. forces should take control and transfer to Guantanamo Bay.
9. A subsequent interview of Hamdi has confirmed the fact that he surrendered
and gave his firearm to Northern Alliance forces which supports his classification
as an enemy combatant...
Taylor, supra note 95, at 9 n.12.
101 See Dunham, supra note 98, at 168 (explaining that the government felt Mobbs'
Declaration was "factually dispositive"); see also Taylor, supra note 95, at 9 (stating that
the government felt the Mobbs Declaration "standing alone" was adequate justification for
Hamdi's detention).
102 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 527, 532 (E.D. Va. 2002) (refusing to give
deference to Mobbs Declaration without judicial review); see also Taylor, supra note 95, at
9 (describing Judge Doumar's lack of support for the Mobbs Declaration).
103 See Hamdi,, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 532 (explaining American citizen's constitutional
entitlement to meaningful judicial review when his individual liberties are being
infringed upon), rev'd, 316 F.3d 450, 476 (4th Cir. 2003) (finding Hamdi not entitled to
dispute Mobbs Declaration), vacated and remanded, 542 U.S. 507, 538-39 (2004)
(plurality opinion) (announcing while documents such as Mobbs Declaration may be used
as evidence against alleged enemy combatant, those accused must be given opportunities
to rebut such evidence); see also Nat Hentoff, The Constitution Trumps the President,
TULSA WORLD, June 13, 2004, at A15 (describing Judge Doumar's anger after reading
government's two-page justification for denying Hamdi his Constitutional rights).
104 Hamdi, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 532 (quoting United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 264
(1967)).
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deemed an end in itself, justifying any exercise of
(executive) power designed to promote such a goal.
Implicit in the term 'national defense' is the notion of
defending those values and ideals which sets this
Nation apart [sic] ... It would indeed be ironic if, in
the name of national defense, we would sanction the
subversion of one of those liberties [sic] ... which
makes the defense of the Nation worthwhile." 105
The judge also noted that, notwithstanding the elusive
designation of Hamdi as an enemy combatant, the government
failed to explain why Hamdi should be treated any differently
than other captured members of the Taliban. More specifically,
Judge Doumar emphasized that since there were no criminal
charges against Hamdi, no reason, other than the classification,
provided to justify either Hamdi's solitary confinement without
communication for four months, or his eight to ten month
incarceration. 106
In fact, Judge Doumar identified deficiencies within each
paragraph of the Mobbs Declaration, which the government
submitted to prove Hamdi's enemy combatant status, and justify
his indefinite incarceration.10 7 The district court held that the
declaration was insufficient to detain Hamdi without due
process, and again ordered the government to produce the
criteria it used to determine Hamdi's enemy combatant status. 108
Once again the government appealed the district court's
judgment to the Fourth Circuit.09
105 Hamdi, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 532 (citing Robel, 389 U.S. at 264).
106 See Taylor, supra note 95, at 9 (reiterating Judge Doumar's review of Mobbs
Declaration); see also County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 53 (1991)
(declaring prompt need for determination before neutral judges where there were
warrantless arrests).
107 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 527, 533-35 (E.D. Va. 2002), rev'd, 316
F.3d 450, 476 (4th Cir. 2003), vacated and remanded, 542 U.S. 507, 538-39 (2004)
(plurality opinion) (enumerating various deficiencies in Government's argument); see also
Taylor, supra note 95, at 9 (delineating Judge Doumar's explanation of various
paragraphs in Mobbs Declaration).
108 See Hamdi, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 535-36 (explaining evidence submitted failed to
prove Hamdi's enemy combatant status); see also Eric K. Yamamoto, Judgments Judged
and Wrongs Remembered: Examining the Japanese American Civil Liberties Cases on
their Sixtieth Anniversary: White (House) Lies: Why the Public Must Compel the Courts to
Hold the President Accountable for National Security Abuses, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
285, 321-22 (2005) (summarizing Judge Doumar's skepticism of Hamdi's classification as
enemy combatant in light of government's failure to produce criteria leading to such
conclusion).
109 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 459 (4th Cir. 2003) (providing procedural
context), vacated and remanded, 542 U.S. 507, 538-39 (2004) (plurality opinion); see also
2006]
ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OFLEGAL COMMENTARY
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit, cited Article I, Section 8110 and
Article II, Section 2111 of the U.S. Constitution to substantiate its
great deference to Congress' and the President's war-making
authorities. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit held that the
Mobbs Declaration was itself sufficient to justify Hamdi's
indefinite detention without access to counsel or appearance in
court. 112 The court stated:
[O]ne who takes up arms against the United States in a foreign
theater of war, regardless of his citizenship, may properly be
designated an enemy combatant and treated as such. The
privilege of citizenship entitles Hamdi to a limited judicial
inquiry into his detention, but only to determine its legality
under the war powers of the political branches. At least where it
is undisputed that he was present in a zone of active combat
operations, we are satisfied that the Constitution does not entitle
him to a searching review of the factual determinations
underlying his seizure there. 113
With that, the Fourth Circuit, relying on Ex parte Quirin's114
precedent, justified the indefinite detention of a United States
citizen who was being held without criminal charges pending
against him, and was being denied communication with
counsel. 115
Hamdi petitioned for a rehearing en banc after the Fourth
Circuit's opinion was handed down, but this petition was denied
eight to four.116 One of the Fourth Circuit's dissenting judges,
Laura Sullivan, U.S. Detention Tests Scope of Antiterror Law; Justices Take up Cases of 2
Citizens Held 2 Years; No Charges; Legal aid Delayed; Unbridled Authority vs. Rights of
Americans, THE BALT. SUN, Apr. 29, 2004, at Al (stating that Fourth Circuit sided with
government on appeal).
110 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 11.
Ill U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 1.
112 See Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 476 ("[D]espite his status as an American citizen
currently detained on American soil, Hamdi is not entitled to challenge the facts
presented in the Mobbs declaration."); see also Gregory Dolin, The Great Writ of
Incoherence: An Analysis of the Supreme Court's Rulings on "Enemy Combatants", 36
GEO. J. INT'L L. 623, 627 (2005) (providing Fourth Circuit's rationale for reversing district
court ruling).
113 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 475 (4th Cir. 2003).
114 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
115 See Yamamoto, supra note 108, at 288 (considering post-9/11 indefinite detentions
without charges or right to attorney assistance of alleged enemy combatants); see also
Taylor supra note 95, at 9 (explaining court's reliance on Ex parte Quirin to hold Hamdi
indefinitely).
116 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 337 F.3d 335, 341 (4th Cir. 2003) (deciding not to rehear
Hamdi's case); see also Bruce Zagaris, U.S. Supreme Court Takes Certiorari Over US
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Judge Motz, pointed out some of the fundamental errors in the
Fourth Circuit's majority opinion.117 Motz noted that the
government had not offered any facts to support its classification
of Hamdi as an enemy combatant, and had denied Hamdi
consultation with counsel or an opportunity to challenge the
allegations of the Mobbs declaration. Thus, Judge Motz stated
Hamdi was being denied the most basic procedural protections
offered by the Constitution.118 Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit
decision stands squarely in the face of Supreme Court precedent
that guarantees even aliens, which Hamdi is not, this
constitutional right.119 Thus Judge Motz notes,
"Without any acknowledgment of its break with precedent, the
panel embarks on a perilous new course-approving the
Executive's designation of enemy combatant status not on the
basis of facts stipulated or proven, but solely on the basis of an
unknown Executive advisor's declaration, which the panel itself
concedes is subject to challenge as 'incomplete' and 'inconsistent'
hearsay."120
When Hamdi reached the Supreme Court in June 2004, the
Court ultimately vacated the Fourth Circuit's judgment and
remanded the case, noting that "a state of war is not a blank
check for the President when it comes to the rights of the
Nation's citizens."121 In a plurality opinion, the Court held that
"due process demands that a citizen held in the United States as
an enemy combatant be given a meaningful opportunity to
Citizen Arrested in Afghanistan, INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP., Mar. 1, 2004, at 96 (stating
court voted not to rehear Hamdi's case eight to four).
117 See Hamdi, 337 F.3d at 369 (Motz, J., dissenting) (expressing her belief that panel
"seriously erred"); see also Benjamin Wittes, Enemy Americans, ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
July-Aug 2004, at 127 (insisting on implementing some mechanism to determine Hamdi's
status).
118 See Hamdi, 337 F.3d at 370-71 (Motz, J., dissenting) ("Denied the most basic
procedural protections, Hamdi could not possibly mount a challenge to the Executive's
designation of him as an enemy combatant."); see also High Court Should Hear Yaser
Esam Hamdi's Case, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Oct. 6, 2003, at B12 (reiterating Judge Motz's
concern that allegations against Hamdi were not tested).
119 See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 775 (1950) (proclaiming courts
entertain alien's pleas to determine whether they are enemies); see also Ludecke v.
Watson, 335 U.S. 160, 172 n. 17 (1948) (explaining that "whether the person restrained is
in fact an alien enemy... may also be reviewed by the courts").
120 Hamdi, 337 F.3d at 371 (Motz, J., dissenting); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316
F.3d 450, 473 (4th Cir. 2003) (describing executive power under the War Powers Act
relating to detention alleged enemy combatants).
121 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004) (plurality opinion) (holding that the
Constitution envisions roles for all three branches of government during war times).
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contest the factual basis for that detention before a neutral
decisionmaker."' 22 The Court recognized that the "threshold
question before [it] [was] whether the Executive has the
authority to detain citizens who qualify as 'enemy
combatants"' 123 but declined to adjudicate this issue. Instead the
Court issued a narrow holding, specifically applicable to
circumstances where the enemy combatant is a United States
citizen who is 'part of or supporting forces hostile to the United
States or coalition partners' in Afghanistan and who 'engaged in
an armed conflict against the United States' there."124 The Court
held that Congress authorized the detention of enemy
combatants in these specific circumstances, but Hamdi, an
American citizen, was constitutionally entitled to contest the
factual basis of his detention before a neutral decision-maker.125
Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsberg, concurred in the
judgment, agreeing that the government must produce
justification for Hamdi's enemy combatant status, but disagreed
with the plurality that Hamdi's detention was authorized.
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Stevens, dissented, arguing that
Hamdi was entitled to habeas relief and that the Authorization
for Use of Military Force (AUMF) falls far short of the requisite
constitutional authority necessary for Hamdi's indefinite
detention.126 In a separate dissent Justice Thomas argued that
the President's designation of Hamdi as an enemy combatant is
constitutional under the Executive's war-making powers and
asserted that "the plurality utterly fails to account for the
Government's compelling interests and for [the Court's]
institutional inability to weigh competing concerns correctly."127
The plurality in Hamdi, therefore, left unresolved the question of
whether the executive can constitutionally deprive a military
122 Id. at 509.
123 Id. at 516.
124 Id. at 516 (quoting Brief for Respondents 3).
125 Id. at 533 (emphasizing the importance of a timely hearing, upon request, on one's
status as an enemy combatant).
126 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 554 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (plurality
opinion) (stating that indefinite detention would be permissible if the Suspension Clause
of the Constitution was in effect, but no party contends the implication of such clause
under the AUMF).
127 Id. at 579 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating Hamdi's habeas petition should be
denied as the judiciary lacks the knowledge to question the Executive's exercise of
congressionally authorized power).
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detainee of due process solely through its designation of 'enemy
combatant' status. On remand, the case was dismissed in
October, 2004.128
C. Jose Padilla
Jose Padilla, like Yasir Hamdi, is an American citizen. 129
Padilla was arrested at O'Hare airport on a federal material
witness warrant for grand jury proceedings in the Southern
District of New York. 130 The government contended that Padilla
had traveled to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Afghanistan, and, while
in Afghanistan, met with al Qaeda operatives and suggested to
them that he steal radioactive materials in the United States for
the purposes of building and detonating a radiological dispersal
device, or "dirty bomb."131 The government further alleged that
Padilla received training from al Qaeda and returned to the
United States in order to conduct reconnaissance or other attacks
on its behalf.132
Padilla was transferred from detention in Chicago to New
York, where defense counsel was appointed to defend him on his
arrest on the material witness warrant.1 33 Before a decision was
returned on the motion to dismiss the warrant, the government
128 See Joel Brinkley & Eric Lichtblau, U.S. Releases Saudi-American it had
Captured in Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2004, at A5 (explaining that Hamdi's
renunciation of US citizenship was condition of release); see also Jerry Markon, Hamdi
Returned to Saudi Arabia; U.S. Citizen's Detention as Enemy Combatant Sparked Fierce
Debate, WASH. POST, Oct. 12, 2004, at A02 (noting that his release means the government
never has to give justification for his detention).
129 See Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 569 (S.D.N.Y 2002) (describing Padilla
as a US citizen arrested in the United States), rev'd Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426
(2004); see also Taylor, supra note 95, at 12 (detailing past offenses including convictions
of murder as a juvenile and on a weapons charge as an adult).
130 Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (1986) federal courts can issue warrants for the
purpose of securing the appearance of material witnesses at grand jury proceedings. See
Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 571. To obtain this warrant, the government showed that
Padilla had information pertinent to grand jury investigations of the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks. See Taylor, supra note 95, at 12.
131 See Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 572-73 (describing allegations made in the Mobbs
Declaration against Padilla); see also Taylor, supra note 95, at 12 (detailing facts
surrounding Padilla's detention).
132 See Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 573 (alleging that Padilla was not a member of Al
Qaeda, but acted under the direction of Al Qaeda officials); see also Taylor, supra note 95,
at 12 n.34 (stating Padilla alleged he was in the US visiting his son).
133 See Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 571 (stating the government detained him in their
ongoing investigations into the September 11th terrorist attacks); see also Taylor, supra
note 95, at 12 (observing defense counsel's assertion that the government lacked probable
cause for Padilla's detention).
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notified the court that it was going to vacate the warrant
anyway.134 The reason for this was because the President had
designated Padilla an enemy combatant and had transferred him
to a naval brig in South Carolina.135 In response, Padilla filed a
petition for habeas corpus, and the government responded the
same way it had in Hamdi, challenging defense counsel's status
to act as next friend and also the court's jurisdiction over the
named respondents. 136 The government also asserted that the
habeas case should be moved to the jurisdiction of Padilla's naval
brig, the Fourth Circuit, where it would conveniently fall
134 See Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 571 (S.D.N.Y 2002) (stating that the
government had withdrawn the subpoena), rev'd Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
135 The Presidential order giving Padilla enemy combatant status read as follows:
To the Secretary of Defense: Based on the information available to me from all
sources,... In accordance with the Constitution and consistent with the laws
of the United States, including the Authorization for Use of Military Force
Joint Resolution (Public Law 107-40); I, George W. Bush, as President of the
United States and Commander in Chief of the U.S. armed forces, hereby
determine for the United States of America that:
(1) Jose Padilla, who is under the control of the Department of Justice and who
is a U.S. citizen, is, and at the time he entered the United States in May 2002
was, an enemy combatant;
(2) Mr. Padilla is closely associated with al Qaeda, an international terrorist
organization with which the United States is at war;
(3) Mr. Padilla engaged in conduct that constituted hostile and war-like acts,
including conduct in preparation for acts of international terrorism that had
the aim to cause injury to or adverse effects on the United States;
(4) Mr. Padilla possesses intelligence, including intelligence about personnel
and activities of al Qaeda, that, if communicated to the U.S., would aid U.S.
efforts to prevent attacks by al Qaeda on the United States or its armed forces,
other governmental personnel, or citizens;
(5) Mr. Padilla represents a continuing, present and grave danger to the
national security of the United States, and detention of Mr. Padilla is
necessary to prevent him from aiding al Qaeda in its efforts to attack the
United States or its armed forces, other governmental personnel, or citizens;
(6) it is in the interest of the United States that the Secretary of Defense detain
Mr. Padilla as an enemy combatant; and
(7) it is... consistent with U.S. law and the laws of war for the Secretary of
Defense to detain Mr. Padilla as an enemy combatant.
Accordingly, you are directed to receive Mr. Padilla from the Department of
Justice and to detain him as an enemy combatant.
See Taylor, supra note 95, at 12 n.37.
136 See Taylor, supra note 95, at 12 (explaining that since Padilla had no outside
contact with friends or family, Padilla's attorney filed the habeas petition on Padilla's
behalf).
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squarely within Hamdi precedent.137 Once again, Michael
Mobbs, on behalf of the government, submitted two declarations
(one sealed, one unsealed)138 that Padilla's attorneys were denied
access to, and both based entirely on hearsay.139 The Southern
District held that the Secretary of Defense was a properly named
defendant and that he fell within the jurisdiction of the Southern
District. 140 On the merits, the court held that the President had
the authority to hold Padilla in custody because of his enemy
combatant status.141
137 See Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 571 (explaining Department of Defense decision to
move Padilla to South Carolina); see also Taylor, supra note 95, at 12 (noting Padilla's
case was heard in the District Court for the Southern District of New York).
138 See Declaration of Michael H. Mobbs, Special Advisor to the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy, Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (02 Civ.
4445(MBM)), available at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/padilla/padillabush82702mobbs.pdf (setting forth
factual basis for Padilla's designation as "enemy combatant"); see also Chris K. lijima,
Shooting Justice Jackson's "Loaded Weapon" at Ysar Hamdi: Judicial Abdication at the
Convergence of Korematsu and McCarthy, 54 SYRACUSE L. REV. 109, 135 n.152 (2004)
(discussing Mobbs Declaration).
139 A summary of the Mobbs Declaration by Judge Mukasey appears as follows:
The Mobbs Declaration states that Padilla was born in New York and
convicted in Chicago, before he turned 18, of murder. Released from prison
after he turned 18, Padilla was convicted in Florida in 1991 of a weapons
charge. After his release from prison on that charge, Padilla moved to Egypt,
took the name Abdullah al Muhajir, and is alleged to have traveled also to
Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan. In 2001, while in Afghanistan, Padilla is
alleged to have approached senior Usama Bin Laden lieutenant Abu Zubaydeh
and proposed, among other things, stealing radioactive material within the
United States so as to build, and detonate a "radiological dispersal device (also
known as a 'dirty bomb') within the United States. Padilla is alleged to have
done research on such a project at an al Qaeda safehouse in Lahore, Pakistan,
and to have discussed that and other proposals for terrorist acts within the
United States with al Qaeda officials he met in Karachi, Pakistan, on a trip he
made at the behest of Abu Zubaydah. One of the unnamed confidential sources
referred to in the Mobbs Declaration said he did not believe Padilla was
actually a member of al Qaeda, but Mobbs emphasizes that Padilla had
extended contacts with senior Al Qaeda members and operatives and that he
acted under the direction of [Abu] Zubaydah and other senior Al Qaeda
operatives, received training from Al Qaeda operatives in furtherance of
terrorist activities, and was sent to the United States to conduct
reconnaissance and/or conduct other attacks on their behalf. As mentioned
above, Padilla was taken into custody on the material witness warrant on May
8, in Chicago, where he landed after traveling, with one or more stops, from
Pakistan.
Taylor, supra note 95, at 13 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
140 See Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 582, 587 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (finding
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld a proper respondent over whom personal jurisdiction
existed); see also Jeffrey S. Becker, Comment, A Legal War on Terrorism: Extending New
York v. Quarles and the Departure from Enemy Combatant Designations, 53 DEPAUL L.
REV. 831, 857 (2003) (recounting procedural holdings).
141 See Padilla, 233 F.Supp.2d at 599 (finding Padilla's detention not violative of
statute nor otherwise prohibited as a matter of law); Iijima, supra note 138, at 136 (noting
the district court's holding).
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On appeal, the Second Circuit upheld the Southern District's
holding that Secretary Rumsfeld was properly served and that
the court had jurisdiction over him.142 Arguing on the merits, the
government asserted that the whole of the United States was a
battlefield.143 This was an intentional use of phraseology on the
part of the government, not necessary to invoke the gravity of the
situation, as the Second Circuit is seated in proximity to the
World Trade Center, but consistent with the Fourth Circuit's
rationale in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.144 Under the rationale of
Hamdi,145 to detain a citizen the government need only show
that he was captured in a "zone of active combat."146 In the case
of Hamdi, who was captured in Afghanistan, 147 that was a small
burden. Padilla was captured in Chicago, a city within the
battlefield that the government asserts is the whole United
States. 148 The court was not persuaded by this argument. 149
142 See Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 708, 710 (2d Cir. 2003) (affirming district
court's findings that personal jurisdiction was appropriate and that Secretary Rumsfeld
was properly before the court), rev'd Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004); see also
Jeffrey R. Babbin, Erika L. Amarante, Victor A. Bolden & Gates Garrity Rokous,
Developments in the Second Circuit: 2003-2004, 37 CONN. L. REV. 963, 979 (2005) (noting
Second Circuit's holding).
143 Taylor, supra note 95, at 28. The government argument reads as follows:
With respect, the al Qaeda made the battlefield the United States, and there's substantial
evidence that they're trying to make the battlefield the United States again. So when we
see somebody in the United States, given the locus of the attacks to date, the locus of
where future attacks are planned, it would seem to be an odd view indeed-the authority
is fine if we can capture somebody over in Afghanistan, but we can't use the same basis in
authority here.
Taylor , supra note 95, at 29 n.56 (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 89, Padilla v.
Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003) (No. 03-2235)).
144 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003); see Taylor, supra note 97, at 29 (positing that
government's "battlefield" argument was fashioned with an eye on satisfying the Fourth
Circuit's test in Hamdi rather than as an appeal to the panel's sensitivities).
145 Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 476.
146 Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 476; see Taylor, supra note 97, at 29 (recounting Fourth
Circuit's standard).
147 See Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 461 (noting Hamdi's capture in Afghanistan was beyond
dispute); see also Jonathan Masur, A Hard Look or a Blind Eye: Administrative Law and
Military Deference, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 441, 468 n. 104 (2005) (summarizing Fourth Circuit's
holding).
148 See Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 699 (2d Cir. 2003) (recounting Padilla's
capture and detention), rev'd Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004); see also Taylor,
supra note 97, at 28-29 (recounting exchange at oral argument before Second Circuit
between government counsel and the appellate judges as to the United States' status as a
"battlefield").
149 See Padilla, 352 F.3d at 711 (distinguishing Hamdi's "battlefield capture" with
Padilla's "domestic arrest"); see also Carl Tobias, Punishment and the War on Terrorism, 6
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1116, 1157 n.235 (2004) (noting Second Circuit's denomination of
Padilla's detention as result of "domestic arrest").
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Rejecting the Fourth Circuit's ruling in Hamdi, and reversing
the Southern District on the merits, the Second Circuit ruled
that the president lacked the Constitutional authority to detain a
United States citizen taken into custody in the United States on
these grounds, and ordered Padilla's release.150 Under this
holding the government would have to either charge Padilla with
a criminal offense or detain him on a material witness
warrant. 151 'Enemy combatant' status alone was not sufficient. 152
The separation of powers argument that worked for the
government in Hamdi in the Fourth Circuit was rejected by the
Second Circuit, which concluded, using a different approach to
separation of powers analysis, that while Congress may provide
the authority to detain United States citizens such as Padilla, the
President, acting alone, may not.153 Furthermore, unlike the
Fourth Circuit, the Second Circuit distinguished Quirin.154 The
court found no authority to detain Padilla without Congressional
authorization, stating that such authority was neither found in
18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) nor in Public Law 107-40, and, determined,
in light of legislative history, that Congress proceeded by way of
a resolution, not a declaration of war, to avoid suspending
citizens' civil liberties.155
150 See Padilla, 352 F.3d at 721 (holding that absent Congressional authorization
President lacked "inherent constitutional authority" to detain American citizen seized in
the United States as an enemy combatant); see also Jason Collins Weida, Note, A
Republic of Emergencies: Martial Law in American Jurisprudence, 36 CONN. L. REV. 1397,
1433-34 (2004) (summarizing court's holding).
151 See Padilla, 352 F.3d at 724 (citing grounds for Padilla's putative civilian
detention); see also Karen C. Tumlin, Comment, Suspect First: How Terrorism Policy is
Reshaping Immigration Policy, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1173, 1217 (2004) (reiterating Second
Circuit's instructions).
152 See Padilla, 352 F.3d at 724 (finding deficiency in President's intrinsic
constitutional authority to order detention based solely on "enemy combatant"
designation); see also Dolin, supra note 114, at 631 n.64 (2005) (stating Second Circuit's
holding).
153 See Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 715 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding paucity of
authority in President's Article I powers to authorize said detention absent
Congressional authorization), rev'd Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004); Cass R.
Sunstein, Recent Decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit: National Security, Liberty and the D.C. Circuit, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
693, 705 (2005) (noting Second Circuit's rejection of notion that President possessed
inherent authority under Article II to detain Padilla).
154 See Padilla, 352 F.3d at 715-17 (noting, inter alia, that in contrast to Padilla,
Quirin "rested on express congressional authorization of the use of military tribunals to
try combatants who violated the laws of war"); Iijima, supra note 138, at 137 n.164
(summarizing Second Circuit's treatment of Quirin).
155 See Padilla, 352 F.3d at 699 (finding no such authorization in Congress's
Authorization for Use of Military Force Joint Resolution passed in the wake of the
September I1th attacks); see also Owen Fiss, The State as an Instrument of Justice: In the
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The language used by the Second Circuit is refreshing in the
wake of the Fourth Circuit's holding in Hamdi. The Supreme
Court, however, avoided answering Padilla's challenge to the
President's authority to detain a United States citizen on the
basis of enemy combatant designation.15 6 Instead, the Court
reversed the Second Circuit and held that the Southern District
lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate Padilla's habeas petition.157 In
doing so, the Court again bypassed the opportunity to expand on
the holding of Hamdi and curtail the Executive's ability to
indefinitely detain those it designates enemy combatants without
providing a justification for such status. 158
Although the Supreme Court narrowly curtailed Executive
power in Hamdi, in both Hamdi and Padilla the Court declined
to establish a definitive constitutional course of conduct for the
Executive regarding the constitutional rights of enemy
combatants.159  The Court was almost presented a third
opportunity in the case of a man who, of those defendants
discussed here, is seemingly the most intimately linked with the
September 11 terrorist attacks.
D. Zacarias Moussaoui
In mid-August 2001, Zacarais Moussaoui, a Moroccan with
French citizenship, was arrested for an immigration violation.160
Shadow of War, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 449, 463 (2003) (noting Second Circuit's
interpretation of the Joint Resolution).
156 See Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 430 (2004) (refusing to respond to raised issue of
whether President had a constitutional right to detain Padilla); see also Erwin
Chemerinsky, Wartime Security and Constitutional Liberty: Detainees, 68 ALB. L. REV.
1119, 1125 (2005) (acknowledging how Supreme Court failed to respond to enemy
combatants issue).
157 See Padilla, 542 U.S. at 430 (stating that Padilla did not file his habeas petition in
proper jurisdiction); see also Chemerinsky, supra note 156, at 1124-25 (reiterating
Supreme Court's ruling).
158 See Chemerinsky, supra note 156, at 1125 (explaining that Supreme Court still
must attend to procedural issues regarding detainees); see also Thomas M. Franck,
Criminals, Combatants, or What? An Examination of the Role of Law in Responding to the
Threat of Terror, 98 A.J.I.L. 686, 688 (2004) (reflecting on Executive power to detain
persons indefinitely after the Hamdi and Guantanamo cases).
159 See Franck, supra note 158, at 688 (commenting on Supreme Court's decision not
to address procedural problems for detainees); see also David D. Coron & Jenny S.
Martinez, International Decision: Availability of U.S. Courts to Review Decision to Hold
U.S. Citizens as Enemy Combatants-Executive Power in War on Terror, 98 A.J.I.L. 782,
785 (2004) (explaining Hamdi decision in connection with U.S. and international law).
160 See U.S. v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 457 (4th Cir. 2004) (stating reason for
Moussaoui's arrest); see also Sarah Downey, Who is Zacarias Moussaoui?, MSNBC.com,
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Less than a month later, in the brutal September 11 attacks, four
commercial airliners were hijacked with five terrorists on three
planes but only four on the last.161 The federal government
indicted Moussaoui in December 2001, alleging that Moussaoui
was present at an al Qaeda training camp in April 1998, arrived
in the United States in February 2001, and shortly thereafter
began taking flight instructions.162 Moussaoui was dubbed the
alleged "2 0 th hijacker"163 and charged with conspiracy to commit
acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries, conspiracy to
commit aircraft piracy,164 conspiracy to destroy aircraft,165
conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction,166 conspiracy to
murder U.S. employees,167 and conspiracy to destroy property.168
Some of these crimes are punishable by death.169
In defending against these charges, Moussaoui sought to call
as witnesses three members of al Qaeda who were captured in
the U.S.'s military campaign in Afghanistan and who are
currently detainees in U.S. military custody.170 Moussaoui
asserted that one of these detainees, named "Witness A" for
Dec. 14, 2001, http://msnbc.msn.com/id/3067363 (stating that Moussaoui was detained by
the FBI due to immigration charges).
161 Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 457 (noting incidents of September 11, 2001); Frank
Dunham, Constitutionalism and the War on Terror: Hamdi Meets Moussaoui in the War
on Terror, 53 DRAKE L.
REV. 839, 847 (2005) (commenting on the breakdown of hijackers in 9/11 attacks).
162 Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 457 (explaining Moussaoui's training and preparation for
9/11 attacks). See Downey, supra note 160 (noting how Moussaoui learned to fly
airplanes).
163 See Dunham, supra note 161, at 847 (referencing to Moussaoui as the 20th
hijacker); see also Downey, supra note 160 (naming Moussaoui as the 20th hijacker).
164 See 49 U.S.C.A. § 46502(2) (2005) (explaining elements of the offense); see also
Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 457 (listing Moussaoui's charges).
165 See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 32(a)(7) (2006) (explaining elements of the offense); see also
U.S. v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 457 (4th Cir. 2004) (listing Moussaoui's charges).
166 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2332a (a) (2006) (explaining elements of the offense); see also
Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 457 (listing Moussaoui's charges).
167 See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1114, 1117 (2006) (explaining elements of the offense); see also
Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 457 (listing Moussaoui's charges).
168 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 844(f) (2006) (explaining elements of the offense); see also
Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 457 (listing Moussaoui's charges).
169 See Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 457 (stating government's demand of death penalty
for six offenses); see also Dunham, supra note 98, at 164 (acknowledging Moussaoui's case
as one with the death penalty).
170 See U.S. v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 458 (4th Cir. 2004) (stating that defense
witnesses were captured during efforts to expunge al Qaeda); see also Dunham, supra
note 98, at 165 (explaining government's refusal to produce 'material witnesses' labeled as
enemy combatants on behalf of the defendant).
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security purposes, would be an important part of his defense.171
This motion was accompanied by a motion seeking pretrial access
to Witness A and a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum in
order to obtain trial testimony from Witness A.172 Over the
Government's objection, the district court determined that
Witness A, who had extensive knowledge of the September 11
plot, could provide material testimony in Moussaoui's defense.173
Acknowledging the government's interest in the protection of
national security, the District Court for the Northern District of
Virginia, where Moussaoui was held, denied Moussaoui's motion
for unmonitored pretrial access and refused to order the
production of Witness A for trial.174 The government's national
security interest, however, was not sufficient to deny Moussaoui
his constitutional right to a fair trial.175 The court issued an
order pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 15176
preserving Witness A's testimony for a deposition for trial.177
Respecting the government's national security interest, the court
ordered that the deposition be taken by a remote video178 and
refused to provide access to Witness A for the purpose of a
deposition.179 The same conflict arose with regard to two other
witnesses in military custody, Witnesses B and C.180 The court
submitted that Moussaoui had adequately demonstrated that the
desired witnesses could provide testimony that a reasonable juror
could believe and would therefore preclude him from being
eligible for the death penalty.'18 Additionally, reasoning that the
171 See Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 458 (describing defendant's necessity for access to
'Witness A'); see also Dunham, supra note 98, at 174 (demonstrating that Moussaoui
proved materiality burden of witnesses).
172 See Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 458 (stating the motions filed by standby counsel
representing Moussaoui); see also Dunham, supra note 161, at 849 (stating that standby
counsel was still making motions to get access to 'material witnesses').
173 See Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 458 (noting that "in particular, the court determined
that Witness A had extensive knowledge of the September 11 plot and that his testimony
would support Moussaoui's claim that he was not involved in the attacks").
174 Id. (explaining the court's reasons in further detail).
175 U.S. v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 458 (4th Cir. 2004) (stating that "the
Government's national security interest must yield to Moussaoui's right to a fair trial").
176 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 15 (a) (1) (allowing a court to order a deposition of a witness
to preserve testimony at trial "because of exceptional circumstances and in the interest of
justice").
177 See Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 458-59 (explaining preservation process).
178 Id. at 458 (explaining that Witness A would be in an undisclosed location).
179 Id. at 459 (noting the refusal).
180 U.S. v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 459 (4th Cir. 2004) (explaining similar conflicts).
181 Id. at 459-60 (noting court's reasoning).
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desired witnesses' testimony could potentially exonerate him
from the attacks, and that a conviction did not necessitate proof
of involvement with the September 11 plot, the court prohibited
the government from offering evidence or suggesting that
Moussaoui had involvement in or knowledge of the September 11
scheme.18 2
Ultimately, the district court granted access, with
modifications for the purpose of national security, to witnesses A,
B, and C for depositions pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 15, rejected the Government's proposed substitutions
for the depositions, and ordered sanctions for the Government's
refusal to produce the witnesses.18 3 The case was appealed to the
Fourth Circuit, which recognized the "questions of grave
significance-questions that test the commitment of this nation to
an independent judiciary, to the constitutional guarantee of a fair
trial even to one accused of the most heinous of crimes, and to the
protection of our citizens against additional terrorist attacks."18 4
Ultimately the Fourth Circuit confirmed the district court's
authority in granting Moussaoui access to the witnesses, and
affirmed that the Government's proposed substitutions for
depositions were inadequate. However, the Fourth Circuit
reversed the District Court's imposition of sanctions on the
Government for failure to produce the witnesses.18 5
The Government asserted that the Executive's interest in war
making should preclude the judiciary's order of production of the
witnesses.18 6 Furthermore, the Government argued that because
District Courts cannot compel the government to grant immunity
to witnesses, they likewise are incapable of compelling the
government to produce witnesses.18 7 The argument set forth by
the government mirrors the separation of powers argument that
persuaded the Fourth Circuit in Hamdi.188 Luckily, in
Moussaoui,189 the Fourth Circuit was less receptive to the
182 Id. at 459-60 (stating reasons for the prohibition).
183 Id. at 461 (noting court's decision).
184 Id. at 456 (explaining why court reversed).
185 U.S. v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 456 (4th Cir. 2004) (explaining Executive's
interest in war).
186 Id. at 466 (noting Government's arguments).
187 Id at 466-67.
188 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 2003).
189 Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 453.
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separation of powers argument and outright rejected the
government's comparison of compelled witnesses to compelled
immunity.190
Moussaoui was charged with heinous acts of violence against
the United States. Furthermore, he has exhibited utter
disrespect for this country and our legal system throughout his
trial.191 While submitting motions pro se, Moussaoui referred to
the "greatest 9/11 operation" and the "dark house" instead of the
White House. 192 Furthermore, he often submitted motions and
other court documents referring to the presiding District Judge,
Leonie Brinkema, as "Lie-oni,"193 and used such titles as "Motion
to Get Time Out Added In the Dirty Game of U.S."194 and
"Motion to Counter Dirty Insider Dealing by Fat Megalo Dunham
for his Chief Pay Persecution Master Ashcroft (a/k/a United
Satan Chief Liar) and to Have Fat Megalo Out of 9/11 Circus
Trial."195  Nonetheless, Moussaoui is entitled to the same
constitutional rights as any other criminal defendant and if his
civil liberties are denied, the stability of the system will be
jeopardized.196
Moussaoui's case seemed to present the Supreme Court with
the perfect opportunity to affirm the Fourth Circuit's ruling and
190 U.S. v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 466-68 (4th Cir. 2004) (explaining why the
comparison did not work).
191 See Motion by Zacarias Moussaoui to Intercept Pro Se Attorney Privileged Mail to
the Court of Appall (Apr. 23, 2003), available at
http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/1:01-cr-00455/docs
/68578/1.pdf (referring to the United States as the "United Satan of America"); see also
Dunham, supra note 20, at 30 (calling Moussaoui 'clever' with his use of words to
disrespect the American legal system).
192 See Motion by Zacarias Moussaoui to Force Fat Megalo Dunham to Submit to
Death, (Apr. 21, 2003), available at http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/1:01-cr-
00455/docs/68546/1.pdf (representing himself, Moussaoui filed multiple motions that
disrespected the American judicial system).
193 See Motion by Zacarias Moussaoui to Expose Lieonie Brinkema (Apr. 23, 2003),
available at http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/1:01-cr-OO455/docs/68581/1.pdf.
194 See Motion by Zacarias Moussaoui to Get Time Out Added In the Dirty Game of
U.S. (Sept. 12, 2002), available at http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/1:01-cr-
00455/docs/67377/1.pdf.
195 See Motion by Zacarias Moussaoui to Counter Dirty Insider Dealing by Fat
Megalo Dunham for his Chief Pay Persecution Master Ashcroft (May 12, 2003), available
at http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/1:01-cr-00455/docs/68749/1.pdf.
196 See United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 482 (2004) (stating need to provide
method to protect defendant's Constitutional rights); see also A. John Rasdan, Criminal
Law in Minnesota: The Moussaoui Case: The Mess from Minnesota, 31 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 1417, 1433 (2005) (highlighting that although the Fourth Circuit had questioned the
scope of Moussaoui's Constitutional rights, the existence of his rights was never in
question).
ENEMY COMBA TANTS AND DUE PROCESS
emphasize concretely that the Executive Branch does not have
carte blanche when it attempts to jeopardize the constitutional
rights of the accused, even when preserving an interest as
important as national security and even when the accused is as
offensive as Moussaoui.197 However, the Supreme Court will not
get this opportunity to review the Fourth Circuit's holding
because Moussaoui pled guilty to the charges against him
without any exchange promise of leniency from the
government.198 The plea was accepted on April 22, 2005 and
whether or not he will be executed is currently being decided by a
jury in Alexandria, Virginia. 199
CONCLUSION: PREVENTING A REPETITION OF HISTORY
Much concern has been expressed regarding the current
Executive branch and recent attempts to increase Executive
power at the expense of civil liberties. While some judicial
deference to the Executive is justifiable in a time of military
crisis, it is essential that the judiciary keep in mind that the
current war is different from the traditional wars in our
history.200 The "War on Terror" is an international war without a
specific enemy and with no end in sight. Many of the current
Administration's critics point to the Patriot Act, enacted shortly
197 See Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 482 (holding that even Moussaoui was entitled to
protection of his civil liberties); see also Rasdan, supra note 196, at 1433 (noting that the
government has not been able to convince the court to deny Moussaoui his Constitutional
rights to produce witnesses).
198 See Michael C. Dorf, Why Al Qaeda Conspirator Zacarias Moussaoui's Guilty Plea
Probably Won't Save His Life, FINDLAW, Apr. 27, 2005,
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20050427.html (suggesting that a guilty plea will not be
sympathetic to a jury); see also Neil A. Lewis, Moussaoui Tells Court He's Guilty of a
Terror Plot, N.Y.TIMES, Apr. 23, 2005, at Al (reporting Moussaoui pled guilty to
conspiracy in a terrorist plot).
199 See Moussaoui Pleas Guilty to Terror Charges, CNN.com, Apr. 23, 2005,
http://www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/04/22/moussaoui/ (discussing Moussaoui's guilty plea); see
also Jerry Markon, Moussaoui Trial Offers Close View for Some; 500 Prospective Jurors to
Receive Summonses, WASH. POST, Dec. 29, 2005, at T01 (stating that Virginia officials
plan to summons five hundred people as prospective jurors).
200 See Scheindlin, supra note 37, at 796 (noting that this war is 'different'); see also
Melissa K. Matthews, Restoring the Imperial Presidency: An Examination of President
Bush's New Emergency Powers, 23 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POLy 455, 456 (2002) (referring
to the war on terrorism as both "extraordinary times" and a "new kind of war").
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after September 11, as evidence of this attempt to increase
executive power 2Ol.
After the September 11 attacks, President Bush presented the
Patriot Act to Congress. The bill was debated in Congress for
thirty minutes and was approved in the Senate by all but one
vote. 202 Critics of the Patriot Act point to it as evidence of the
President's attempt to enlarge his authority and even as a means
to establish an "imperial presidency."203 Essentially, the Patriot
Act enhances the Executive's surveillance powers, giving federal
agents the authority to obtain personal records and conduct
searches and seizures of homes or offices without notice. 204 The
Act illustrates increasing Executive power at the expense of civil
liberties integral to the American conception of freedom and
emphasizes the need for the Court to confine Executive authority
to its constitutional limits.
Moussaoui was not the last opportunity for the Court to issue a
holding that imposes limits on the Executive's authority as
Commander in Chief. Indeed, the most recent rulings regarding
detainees incarcerated at the United Stated naval base in
Guantanamo Bay, without access to tribunals or even charges
brought against them, have been remanded to the district courts
to consider the merits of their habeas corpus claims.205
The judiciary is by no means a weak and impotent branch of
government as intended by the Founders, and many of its
201 See Scheindlin, supra note 37, at 843 (discussing enhanced executive powers
granted by the Patriot Act); see also Matthews, supra note 200, at 458 (noting that the
Patriot Act grants new tools to the Executive Branch).
202 See Matthews, supra note 200, at 474 (noting that only one senator voted against
the Patriot Act); see also Scheindlin, supra note 37, at 842-43 (stating that the Patriot Act
was passed after only six weeks following September 11).
203 See Matthews, supra note 200, at 456 (noting that critics suggest President Bush
intends to continue to expand Executive power); see also Burns H. Weston, Symposium,
International Sanctions Against Iraq: Where are we After Ten Years? Living History
Interview with Bessie Dutton Murray Distinguished Professor of Law Emeritus and
Director of the University of Iowa Center for Human Rights, 11 TRANSNAT'L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 431, 449 (2001) (discussing the expansion of executive power).
204 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat.
272, 213 (2001); see Matthews, supra note 200, at 458 (specifying the expansion of
Executive power granted by the Patriot Act).
205 See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 485 (2004) (ruling decided and reported together
with Al Odah v. United States); see also Norman C. Bay, Executive Power and the War on
Terror, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 335, 371 (2005) (suggesting that this line of cases will lead to
further assessments of the bounds of executive authority).
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decisions have shaped the law and society of the nation. 206
Equipped with this power, it is imperative that the Court
establish a clear and authoritative message to the Executive,
demanding process for the accused and recognition of their
Constitutional rights. Protecting the safety of the nation and
securing it from future terrorist attacks is undoubtedly a priority
for the Executive, as well as for the other two branches of
government. This goal, however, can and must be achieved
without jeopardizing the rights of the criminally accused. It is up
to the Court to mandate that the Executive act within the
confines of the Constitution when seeking to protect those
liberties the Constitution was designed to secure.
206 See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (holding that
discrimination based on race in public schools is unconstitutional); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
959 (1973) (holding that women have a constitutional right to an abortion).
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